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Approach-avoidance behaviors are observed across a broad range of species. For
humans, we tend move toward things we like, and away from things we dislike. Previous
research tested whether repeatedly shifting visuo-spatial attention toward an object in
response to eye gaze cues can increase liking for that object. Here, we tested whether
a gaze-liking effect can occur for verbal descriptions of looking behavior without shifts of
attention. Also, we tested the gaze specificity hypothesis – that the liking effect is specific
to gaze cues – by comparing the effect of different types of cue (pointing gestures and
arrow cues). In Experiment 1, participants (N = 205) were split into 5 groups according to
the type of cue that was described as directed either toward or away from an object. The
results show that (1) attention is not necessary; the liking effect was recorded for verbal
descriptions of looking, (2) the effect also occurs for descriptions of pointing and arrows,
and (3) the liking effect is enhanced for gaze cues compared to arrows, consistent with
the gaze specificity hypothesis. Results from a further experiment suggest that the effect
is not due to demand compliance. We conclude that the gaze-liking effect occurs for
verbal descriptions of eye gaze. Indeed, because our method bypasses altogether the
use of visual cues, objects, and shifts in visual selective attention, our paradigm appears
to be more sensitive at tapping into the fundamental approach-avoidance response
that mediate the implicit liking effect. As such, it offers new opportunities for research
investigations in the future.
Keywords: gaze, arrows, liking, attention, cue
INTRODUCTION
Approach-avoidance reactions are a fundamental aspect of human behavior – we move away from
things we dislike and toward things we like. Because people have the capacity to infer mental states
from other people, it follows that that people might use other people’s approach-avoidance behavior
as a basis for their own decisions and preferences. If I see you move toward an object, then that may
indicate that I will also like that object. Similarly, if I see your eyes gaze toward an object then I
might infer that the object is desirable.
To study the effects of gaze direction on object liking one innovative study (Bayliss et al.,
2006) used an implicit learning task, in which shifts of attention were expected to increase object
desirability. During the task, participants were asked to classify an object that appeared to the left
or right of a face. The objects were presented in different colors. Across trials, the face looked
consistently either toward or away from one of the colored versions of the object. In a final block of
trials, participants both classified the object and rated the extent to which they liked the object. The
key finding was increased liking for gazed-at objects – people rated objects as more likeable if they
saw people gaze repeatedly toward rather than away from the objects.
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This effect appeared to reflect an implicit process because
participants did not report being aware that gaze direction had
been deliberately manipulated to look toward certain objects,
and away from other objects. Support for the idea that people
had shifted attention in response to the gaze cues came from
analyses of reaction times – reaction times were faster when the
eyes appeared to look toward the location of a target (congruent
trials) compared to away from the target (incongruent trials).
Finally, and in keeping with the idea of a specialized social
perception process, the effect of cue direction on liking did
not occur when the gaze cues were replaced by arrows (Bayliss
et al; Experiment 2). Other studies have extended this work
by, for example, varying attributes of the face that are relevant
to social interaction including expression (Bayliss et al., 2007),
trustworthiness (King et al., 2011; Treinen et al., 2012) and
attractiveness (Strick et al., 2008).
Despite the intuitive plausibility of the gaze-liking effect, a
recent replication attempt (Tipples and Pecchinenda, 2018) of
the gaze-liking effect indicated that the effect is much smaller
(dz = 0.02) than originally thought (dz = 0.94). One possible
reason for the small effect size is that the implicit learning task
used in previous research does not directly assess the question
of interest “Do participants prefer objects that are looked at by
other people?” Instead, the task requires (implicit) learning of
a relationship between gaze direction and objects, via shifts in
attention. Some participants may fail to learn the gaze-object
relationship – perhaps because they do not shift and maintain
their attention to the object on some trials – and consequently,
liking does not increase for gazed-at objects.
Our hypothesis for the current research is that the method
used to increase liking – learning the gaze-object relationship
via shifts in attention – is not necessary for gaze and other
cues to affect liking for objects. Instead, all that is required is
to present cue information and ask for ratings of likeability.
We tested this idea across 5 groups of participants in which we
varied the type of cue information. To test for a relation between
cue direction and object liking we used verbal descriptions of
gaze and other types of cue information. Our reason for using
verbal descriptions was that mental states can be described by
verbal communication (for a review see; Saxe, 2006) and language
is related the development of mental state attribution (Dunn
and Brophy, 2005). Our second hypothesis relates to the type
of cue used to direct attention. Following previous research, we
tested the gaze specificity hypothesis; that the gaze liking effect is
unique to eye gaze cues. Specifically, cue type was varied between
participants by allocating participants to one of five different
groups. These are described below in detail.
Participants in the first group (LOOK – IMAGE) were asked
to rate images of household objects that were paired with verbal
descriptions of actors gazing toward (“Michael looked toward”)
or away from (“Michael looked away from”) an image of an
object. For the second group, (LOOK – WORD), the actors were
described gazing toward or away from a verbal description of the
object (e.g., “a screwdriver”) rather than a picture of the object.
For the third group (POINT) the word “pointed” replaced the
word “looked” (“Michael pointed away from”). A fourth group
(ARROW) received verbal descriptions of an arrow pointing
toward (“An arrow pointed toward”) or away from (“An arrow
pointed away from”) the objects. Given the findings of previous
research (Bayliss et al., 2006) we do not expect arrow cues to
increase liking but rather expect the liking effect to be restricted
to either gaze cues (the LOOK – IMAGE and LOOK – WORD
groups). To test for the overall effect of presenting a directional
cue, a further control condition (WORD – ONLY) was included
in which any mention of the cue was removed and participants
were presented with either the word “toward” or “away.” Finally,
in Experiment 2 we tested for possible demand compliance.
EXPERIMENT 1
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants were 205 students (125 female, 80 male) from
the University of British Columbia. The mean age (and
standard deviation) of the male and female participants in each
experimental group are displayed in Table 1. The experiment
was carried out in accordance with the ethical standards of the
American Psychological Association and with the 1964 Helsinki
declaration and its later amendments. The study was approved
by the Psychology Ethics Committee at University of British
Columbia, Vancouver. Written, informed consent was obtained
from all participants in the study.
Stimuli and Procedure
For the first LOOK – IMAGE group, the stimuli consisted of the
images of 16 objects typically found in a garage (e.g., pliers and
rake) and 16 objects typically found in a kitchen (e.g., electric
whisk and saucepan). For the remaining groups (LOOK – WORD,
POINT, ARROW, and WORD ONLY) words replaced the images
used in the LOOK – IMAGE group. The images of objects were
selected by the first author on the basis that they were easily
recognizable as objects that might typically be found in either
the garage or kitchen. For all subsequent conditions (LOOK –
WORD, POINT, ARROW, and WORD – ONLY), the images were
replaced with verbal descriptions of the objects (e.g., “Pliers”).
All objects or verbal descriptions of objects were rated on a single
sheet of paper (see Supplementary Material for the sheets used
for the LOOK – IMAGE and LOOK – WORD groups). On one
TABLE 1 | The number (N), mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of the age of
male and female participants as a function of group (LOOK – IMAGE, LOOK –
WORD, POINT, ARROW, and WORD ONLY).
Sex
Male Female
M SD N M SD N
LOOK – IMAGE 20.91 1.88 23 21.25 4.62 20
LOOK – WORD 19.50 1.65 22 20.32 1.84 22
POINT 21.93 1.07 14 22.83 3.27 23
ARROW 22.21 2.08 14 21.73 1.8 30
WORD – ONLY 22.43 2.44 7 22.33 2.77 30
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TABLE 2 | Mean liking ratings as a function of group (LOOK – IMAGE, LOOK –
WORD, POINT, ARROW, and WORD ONLY) and cue direction (toward and away).
Toward Away
Experiment Example text M SD M SD
LOOK – IMAGE∗ “Michael looked away...” 5.53 0.87 4.76 0.99
LOOK – WORD “Michael looked away...” 5.60 0.92 4.70 1.08
POINT “Michael pointed away...” 5.47 0.98 5.03 1.11
ARROW “The arrow pointed away...” 5.45 0.91 5.17 0.91
WORD ONLY “Toward” or “Away” 5.38 0.97 5.33 0.93
∗ In the LOOK – IMAGE experiment participants rated pictures of objects. All other
groups read descriptions of objects.
side of the paper a person was described as looking toward the
object (e.g., “Michael looked toward the”). On the other side the
person was described as looking away from the same object (e.g.,
“Michael looked away from the”). The text appeared above the
object name. On each side, object names appeared in a fixed
location in one of four columns. Each column contained one
specific type of object. From left to right, the columns contained
descriptions garage objects followed by 2 columns of kitchen
objects and finally, the remaining 8 garage objects.
Procedure
Participants were randomly allocated to one of five groups
(LOOK – IMAGE, LOOK –WORD, POINT, ARROW, and
WORD ONLY). Testing took place in large classroom in
groups of approximately 20–30 participants. The order in
which a specific side of the sheet of paper was completed was
counterbalanced across participants. For example, half of the
participants in the LOOK group received the description of
a person looking toward a specific object first, followed by a
description of the same person looking away from the same
objects (on the reverse of the sheet) whereas the remaining
participants received the description in the reverse order.
Participants were asked to rate the degree to which they liked the
objects using the following 9-point scale: 1, do not like at all; 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, like very much.
Participants were informed that there were no correct or
incorrect answers. The scale appeared beneath each object name.
In the POINT condition, the word “looked” was replaced by the
word “pointed.” In the ARROW group the words “an arrow”
replaced the names given to the actors and the word “pointed”
was also used (e.g., “an arrow pointed toward the”). Finally, in the
WORD ONLY condition, the description of the person or arrow
looking or pointing was removed – participants received either
the word “toward” or “away” above the object name.
Results and Discussion
The mean liking ratings and standard deviations for each
combination of cue direction and group are shown in Table 2.
The mean liking ratings were analyzed in a cue direction (toward,
away) X group (LOOK – IMAGE, LOOK – WORD, POINT,
ARROW, and WORD ONLY) mixed ANOVA with cue direction
as the within subjects variable. There was a main effect of cue
direction, F(1,203) = 47.60, p < 0.0001 and a cue direction
X group interaction, F(4,203) = 4.74, p < 0.005. The main
effect of group was not significant, F(4,203) = 0.55, p = 0.70.
Our prediction was that the cueing effect would be restricted
to descriptions of eye gaze behavior (the LOOK groups) and
therefore, we analyzed the interaction by testing for the simple
main effect of cue direction (toward vs. away) for each group
separately. Mean liking ratings for objects were higher in the
toward condition compared to the away condition for the
LOOK – IMAGE, F(1,43) = 15.32, p < 0.0001, LOOK – WORD,
F(1,43) = 19.05, p < 0.0001, POINT, F(1,38) = 14.05, p < 0.0001
and ARROW group, F(1,43) = 5.95, p < 0.05 but not the WORD
ONLY group, F(1,36) = 0.33, p = 0.57.
In addition, as can be seen in Figure 1, there were relative
differences in the magnitude of the cue liking effect (mean liking
ratings in the toward condition minus mean liking ratings in
the away condition) as a function of group. Specifically, post hoc
analyses of the cue liking effect (mean liking ratings toward minus
mean liking ratings away) using the Tukey-Kramer adjustment
for multiple pairwise comparisons showed that the magnitude
of the liking effect was higher in the LOOK – IMAGE condition
compared to the WORD ONLY group [difference = 0.71; 95%
CIadjusted (0.09–1.34), padjusted = 0.015] and also, higher in
the LOOK – WORD group compared to both the ARROW
[difference = 0.61; 95% CIadjusted (0.01–1.21), padjusted = 0.041]
and WORD ONLY [difference = 0.84; 95% CIadjusted (0.21–1.46),
padjusted = 0.002] groups.
EXPERIMENT 2
We have shown that a variety of cues affect object liking,
and moreover, the effect occurs for verbal descriptions of
both the cue and the target object. Our interpretation is that
individuals base their preference on previous experience –
they know that people often look toward objects they like,
and look away from objects they dislike, and people use
this knowledge to help decide whether they like or dislike
an object. An alternative interpretation is that the apparent
effects are due to demand compliance – participants reported
higher ratings for cued objects simply because they thought
they were supposed to. The lack of an effect in the WORD
ONLY group seems to rule out this possibility. However,
it is possible that participants in this condition may not
have had sufficient information to understand the implications
of the word in isolation and consequently failed to rate
the objects as liked more in the toward condition vs.
the away condition.
To address the issue of demand compliance Bayliss et al.
(2006) asked participants (during a post-experimental debrief)
what they felt had influenced their ratings. In that study,
participants never mentioned the cue, and appropriately the
investigators concluded that participants did not work out the
purpose of the study. Therefore, we attempted to replicate the
LOOK – IMAGE in a new sample of participants who were asked
(at debriefing) to list any factors that they thought may have may
have influenced their ratings of items. The stimuli were identical
to those used in the LOOK – IMAGE condition and also, the
order in which a specific side of the sheet of paper was completed
was counterbalanced across participants.
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FIGURE 1 | The mean cueing effect (mean toward liking rating minus mean away liking rating) with bootstrapped error bars (95% CI) as a function of cue type
(LOOK – IMAGE, LOOK – WORD, POINT, ARROW, and WORD ONLY).
Materials and Methods
Participants
There 74 participants (mean age = 20.43; SD = 4.04; 61
females and 13 males). The experiment was carried out
in accordance with the ethical standards of the American
Psychological Association and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration
and its later amendments. The study was approved by the
Psychology Ethics Committee at University of British Columbia,
Vancouver. Written, informed consent was obtained from all
participants in the study.
Design and Procedure
The design and procedure were identical to the LOOK – IMAGE
condition in Experiment 1 except that participants were asked (at
debriefing) to list any factors that they thought may have may
have influenced their ratings of items.
Results and Discussion
Following Bayliss et al. (2006) none of the participants mentioned
direction of cue as having influenced their ratings but instead,
reported basing their ratings on various aspects (e.g., usefulness)
of the target objects. A paired samples t-test, showed that
participants gave higher mean liking ratings in the toward
condition (M = 4.90; SD = 1.07) compared to the away condition
(M = 4.32; SD = 0.99), t(73) = 4.43, p < 0.001 [difference = 0.58;
95% CI (0.32–0.84)].
General Discussion
The results show that increased liking for gazed-at objects is
also found for verbal descriptions of gaze direction. Specifically,
participants rated both images and verbal descriptions of objects
as more likeable after reading a written description of a person
looking toward rather than away from the objects. Although the
results showed that the cue direction effect was not specific to
eye gaze – the gaze liking effect was recorded for descriptions
of pointing and also, for an arrow cue – the effect was largest
in magnitude for descriptions of gaze behavior. In other words,
the results offer partial support for the gaze specificity hypothesis
because descriptions of individuals looking at objects produced
the largest effect – eye gaze may not be unique but it is a
highly effective cue.
The finding that non-social cues also exert influence contrasts
with the lack of an effect for arrows reported previously in
a study using an implicit measure of influence (Bayliss et al.,
2006). As noted earlier this may because the original gaze-liking
effect is much smaller than previously thought, and consequently,
detecting such effect for arrow cues will be difficult unless the
sample size is very large (N > 500; see Tipples and Pecchinenda,
2018). In contrast, in the current research, the effect was
replicable and therefore, the current task is more suitable for
testing for differences in magnitude across different cue types.
Indeed, as already noted, the current data go some way to
supporting the existence of a mechanism that is more sensitive
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to social vs. non-social cue differences because the effect of
gaze on liking (in the LOOK WORD condition) was relatively
greater than the arrow cue condition. This increased sensitivity
for gaze cues may reflect a specifically social process that evolved
to respond to gaze cues but has been co-opted to respond to
other cue types.
In keeping with research designed to investigate mental state
attribution, the effect of gaze on liking generalized to verbal
stimuli, i.e., the effects do not depend on actual visual observation
of either the cue or object stimuli. One interpretation of this
finding is that the effects of cue stimuli on liking reflect existing
knowledge. When forced to make a liking decision based on
limited information participants rely on what they know about
the relationship between cue direction and the likeability of
objects. What knowledge is relevant to direction cues and
object evaluation? Individuals may rely on knowledge of human
motivation to either approach a rewarding object or avoid an
unpleasant object when they read descriptions of individuals
looking toward or away from an object. Put differently,
participants may know that gazing-away from an object typically
means that the object is not rewarding and therefore, they give
the object a lower rating. A reliance on existing knowledge
does not necessarily mean that the gaze-induced-liking is not
rooted in a biologically based process. The tendency to use gaze
and facial expressions as a basis for evaluating objects may still
have a biological basis that is present in the early stages of
human development.
Comparison of the WORD ONLY condition with the words
“TOWARD” and “AWAY” with “LOOK – WORD” condition
indicates that simply presenting motivational relevant words
is not sufficient to record a gaze liking effect. Instead, the
current findings suggest that sentence frame in which an
actor is described as acting toward an object is needed
to record the gaze-liking effect. One interpretation of this
finding is that the gaze-liking effect requires propositional
knowledge – a statement about the world and more specifically
a statement about relationships in the world (“Michael looked
toward...”). This finding accords with a growing recognition
that propositional knowledge contributes to implicit evaluation
processes (De Houwer, 2014). Specifically, according to the
propositional model of implicit evaluation (De Houwer, 2014)
automatic evaluation depends on the formation or activation of
propositional knowledge. The current results are consistent with
such an account.
Were our cue effects due to demand compliance? Put
differently, did participants work out the purpose of the
study and then respond in the manner expected by the
experimenter? Following the methodology of Bayliss et al. (2006),
our participants in Experiment 2 did not report using the
cue to make their likeability judgments. Bayliss et al. (2006)
concluded that the lack of self-reported knowledge indicated
that their participants had not worked out the purpose of
the study. Against this high standard we also conclude that
participants in our investigation had not worked out the
purpose of the study, that is, the effects were not due to
demand compliance.
In conclusion we have shown that shifting attention to an
object is not necessary for eye gaze cues to influence object
liking – the effect occurs for verbal descriptions of eye gaze.
Furthermore, a variety of cues can influence object liking –
the effect is not restricted to eye gaze cues – and moreover,
the effects were not due to demand compliance. In sum, our
results suggest a separate, conceptually based route, by which
cue direction can affect object evaluation. Whether this route is
also responsible for previous findings of liking that employed the
gaze cue paradigm is an exciting issue for future investigation.
One thing is very clear, while the conceptually based route
may explain past findings of liking with the gaze cue paradigm,
those past findings with the gaze cue paradigm are unable to
account for the present data insofar as they are grounded on the
assumptions that an external gaze cue and a shift of visuo-spatial
attention toward or away from an object are necessary to trigger
a liking effect.
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